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I. INTRODUCTION

In increasing numbers, federal, state, and local governments are
regulating property in the name of environmental protection.' Over the last

* Nancie G. Marzulla is the president and chief legal officer of Defenders of Property Rights,
the nation's only legal defense foundation devoted exclusively to the protection ofprivate property
rights. Immediately prior to working for Defenders, Ms. Marzulla was a sole practitioner in
litigation and legislative advocacy of environmental and natural resources matters.

1. Although other government regulations can violate the U.S. Constitution's Fifth
Amendment-see, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (striking down a federal law that
provided for escheat of tribal property interests); Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu,
802 F.Supp. 326 (D.Haw. 1992) (city ordinance imposing ceilings on lease rents); Seawall
Assoc. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1050 (N.Y. 1989) (overturning a city city ordinance
prohibiting the demolition, alteration, or conversion of single-room occupancy rental properties);
and United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993) (finding
no taking in a city ordinance designating property as historic)-this Article is limited to a
discussion of environmental regulations.
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two decades the growth of this country's environmental regulatory regime has
been nothing short of astonishing. It accounts for many of the regulations
covering almost every aspect of our lives, which grow by 200 pages each day
in the Federal Register. The number of laws we are obliged to obey has
grown by a staggering 3,000 percent since just the turn of the century. 2
The result is that the United States has the most complex and intrusive
environmental protection laws in the world. They also are the most expensive.
On budget, environmental regulation annually costs Americans between $120
billion and $300 billion. An additional $1 billion is paid to the federal
government in cleanup costs by American companies every year.3 Another
$62.9 million was paid in criminal penalties as a result of the more than 200
federal criminal indictments for alleged environmental crimes. 4
Off budget, countless individuals across the nation are being singled out
to bear the costs of implementing environmental policies that government is
unwilling to pay by itself. Through its ability to regulate, the government
"takes" whatever use and benefits to property it wishes. Since the title to the
property stays with the owner, the government finds that only rarely is it
forced to pay for it. For example, regulations imposed to protect wetlands
proclaim that more than 100 million acres of land in this country must remain
in pristine condition, as required by a definition of "wetland" that has no basis
in science (and when Congress itself has never even agreed upon a definition
for a wetland, scientific or otherwise).' Seventy-five percent of all wetland
in this country is privately "owned," but the unlucky owners must leave their
land untouched due to such regulations, and rarely will receive any payment
from the government for so doing. Likewise, endangered species habitat locks
up additional hundreds of thousands of acres of privately-owned land. While
the protected species often is something as ecologically insignificant as the few
salamanders living in pools that feed off the Edwards Aquifer in San Antonio,
Texas, their protection threatens the future of a thriving city's water supply.6
Environmental protection has been pitted against the rights of the
individual to use and benefit from his own land, and against the ability of
communities to maintain a tax base. This has left a bitter taste in the mouths
of millions of people all across America who are beginning to fight back.

2. Nancy Hollander, The More Corrupt the Republic, The More the Laws, Champion,
November 1992, at 3.
3. House Committees, Legal Expert PredictProbeofDOJEnforcement Will Continue, Daily
Env't Rep. (BNA), at AA-14 (Oct. 8, 1992).
4. Memorandum of Neil Cartusciello, Chief of Environmental Crimes Section, U.S. Dep't
of Justice (Mar. 31, 1992).
5. See United States v. Mills, 817 F. Supp. 1546, 1553-54 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
6. See, e.g., Linda Kanamine, Texans Wage War Over Water Species, USA TODAY, March
4, 1993, at A10; Tom Kenworth, One-Inch Fish Threatens to ParchSan Antonio, WASH. POST
February 14, 1993, at A3.
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These people are organizing and learning about their rights, trying to find
ways to seek relief from the "environmental overkill" 7 that has become so
rampant in this country. They also are taking their cause to the courts-and
emerging victorious in large numbers.
Most notably, however, they are turning their frustration into political
capital that has translated into the introduction of more than a hundred
property rights bills in forty-four states. 8 Property owners have chosen to
fight back in the forums they know best-state and local governments-which
inturn are ahead of the federal government in turning the tide in favor of
private property rights. Those who once felt powerless to protect their rights
are aggressively seeking relief, passing laws that require prior assessment of
the potential "takings" implications of new rules before they go into effect.
Some states have gone even further, introducing bills that ease the litigation
burden facing the state and the property owner by clarifying when compensable takings have occurred.
This Article opens by describing the enormous growth of the environmental regulatory state.9 It then discusses why neither the judiciary'I nor the
federal executive or legislature" has played a satisfactory role in protecting
private property rights against uncompensated "environmental takings." This
shows why it is no surprise that the people are turning, with increasing
success, to state legislatures for this protection.' 2 The Article concludes with
a reminder that private property rights are a fundamental human right.3
II. THE GROWTH OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY STATE

Environmental regulations touch virtually every individual in this country
on a daily basis. Environmental laws regulate the air we breathe, the water
we drink, the food we eat, the clothes we wear, and the homes in which we
live. Likewise, nearly every sector of the economy is touched by environmental laws, whose reach is becoming increasingly global. Today, environmental
regulations extend from the depths of the oceans to the heights of the
stratosphere, from the rain forests of South America to the windswept heights

7. See DIXIE LEE RAY

& Lou Guzzo,

ENVIRONMENTAL OVERKILL: WHATEVER HAPPENED

TO COMMON SENSE? (1993). The book contrasts the enormous, hidden costs of environmental

regulation with the often illusory public benefits of such regulations.
8. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 605 (Supp. 1994); IND. CODE § 4-22-2-32 (Supp.
1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-90-1 to 63-90-4 (Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.040
(Supp. 1994).

9. Infra part II.
10. Infra part III.
11. Infra part IV.
12. Infra part V.
13. Infra part VI.
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of the mountains of Mongolia and back again, to include a blind salamander
living in a single cave in Arkansas and enormous whales under the sea. It is
no wonder the individual often feels incapable of protecting his rights against
this massive regulatory steamroller.
A. What the Federal Government Has in Storefor Us
Most of the major environmental statutes have long since passed their
expiration dates, and are in need of reauthorization. Members of both houses
introduced a broad array of bills in the 103rd Congress to reauthorize and
amend the Clean Water Act, 4 the Endangered Species Act,"5 the Resource
and Conservation Recovery Act 6 (RCRA), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 7 (CERCLA or "Superfund"). None passed, but all likely will be back in the 104th Congress.
As written, the bills generally would have increased penalties for
violations, tightened regulatory requirements, and expanded regulations over
large groups of individuals and activities not currently subject to federal
environmental jurisdiction. One bill, for example, would have defined an
individual convicted of an environmental offense as a "bad actor," disqualifying the convicted person or company from participation in government
contracting, loan, and grant programs.' 8 Another bill would have authorized
federal judges to compel corporations to adopt comprehensive environmental
compliance programs designed by an outside consultant appointed by the court,
and would have punished infractions of the compliance plan as probation
violations. 19
The Clinton administration has given high priority to environmental
issues. It is seeking to abolish the Council on Environmental Quality (an
independent office established by Congress), replacing it with direct White
House control over environmental issues.2 0 The administration, along with
some in Congress, also strongly supports elevation of the Environmental
Protection Agency to cabinet status as the United States Department of
Environmental Protection.2' Vice President Gore has taken direct charge of

14. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
15. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993).
18. H.R. 908, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (the "Bad Actors" bill).
19. H.R. 3461, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
20. Tom Kenworthy, ClintonPlan on CEQ Sparks Tiff with Environmentalists,WASH. POST,
March 25, 1993, at A22.
21. Gary Lee, House Leaders Defer Vote on Cabinet Rank for EPA; GOP Opposition to
Clinton Measure Growing, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1993, at A4; Tom Kenworthy, Synar May
Push Stop on EPA Elevator, WASH. POST, April 7, 1993, at A25.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss4/6

4

Marzulla: State Private Property Rights Initiatives As a Response To "Envir

1995]

PROPERTY RIGHTS INITIATIVES

the newly created White House Office of the Environment, and has demonstrated a personal interest in virtually every environmental and natural resource
policy issue. At the April 2, 1993, Timber Summit in Portland, Oregon, held
to discuss environmental issues in the Northwest forests, President Clinton and
Vice President Gore were joined by no fewer than seven cabinet members,
each of whom offered his or her own suggestions for dealing with issues such
as spotted owls, timber, and jobs.'
Vice President Gore also has personally proposed a new method of
reviewing government regulations-with a special emphasis on environmental
regulations-to replace Office of Management and Budget review under
Executive Order No. 12,291' Although the outlines of the Gore proposal
are not yet clear, his new process undoubtedly will be even more favorable to
expansive government regulation. Indeed, the Clinton administration gives
strong evidence of subscribing to Vice President Gore's exhortation that the
world adopt a new "central organizing principle":
embarking on an all-out effort to use every policy and program, every law
and institution, every treaty and alliance, every tactic and strategy, every
plan and course of action-to use, in short, every means to halt the
destruction of the environment and to preserve and nurture our ecological
system.24
B. Federal Environmental Statutes
and Their Influence on State Law
None of this is to say that environmental overkill by the federal
government is anything new. Existing federal environmental statutes
comprehensively regulate vast segments of our nation's economy-touching
upon land, water, air, natural resources, timber, wildlife, and a whole host of
other components of the biosphere. Although early federal environmental
regulation can be traced to conservationists like John Muir, Gifford Pinchot,

22. Ruth Marcus, Clinton to Hold Talks in Oregon on Forests,WASH. POST, March 11, 1993,
at A13; Tom Kenworthy, The Owl and the Lumberjack: Can ClintonBreak the Logjam?, WASH.
POST, April 2, 1993, at A4; Tom Kenworthy & Ann Devroy, Clinton Pledges "Balanced"
Solution to ForestPolicy Crisisin 2 Months, WASH. POST, April 3, 1993, at A9.
23. Stephen Barr, "Reinvention" Delivers Smaller U.S. Bureaucracy, But Will the Goal of
Better Service Suffer?, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1994, at Al; Stephen Barr, Fast Track to
Streamlined Procurement?Seeking Action by Year's End, Administration to ProposeLegislative
Package on Tuesday, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1993, at A17; Stephen Barr, White House Shifts
Role in Rule-Making; Clinton Seeks to End Closed-DoorProcess, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1993,
at Al; Stephen Barr, Reinventing Government Moves Forward,More or Less Smoothly, WASH.
POST, March 12, 1993, at A21.
24. AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRrr 274 (Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1992).
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and Theodore Roosevelt, the modem environmental regime, for all practical
purposes, was born on the first Earth Day-April 22, 1970. Congress passed
a string of environmental statutes in rapid succession, weaving a net of
regulations that covers virtually every aspect of property use and ownership.
Not only do these regulations involve the federal government in limiting
the exercise of private property rights, but they have required, encouraged, or
served as a model for greater state and local regulation as well. The major
federal statutes are set out below.'
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)26 requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement for any major federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. Since "major
federal action"27 encompasses permits and authorizations of many kinds, from
specific projects such as road construction or mineral and timber sales to
generic programs like oil leasing or gas exploration on federal lands, NEPA,
in fact, affects a broad array of private resource development. Opponents of
this kind of development rely upon NEPA-often referred to as the "grandfather of all environmental statutes"-as a means of stopping the project on the
grounds that an environmental impact statement was either not prepared or is
inadequate.
The Clean Air Act," originally passed in 1970, significantly amended
in 1977,11 and massively overhauled in 1990,30 regulates emissions of
pollutants into the atmosphere. It requires permits for "major sources" of
pollution, especially particulates, volatile organic compounds, sulfur dioxides,
nitrogen oxides, air toxins, and depleters of stratospheric ozone.3' Regulations that implement the Clean Air Act of 1990 still are being written, so basic
questions about operating permits and air quality requirements remain
unanswered. Like the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act is implemented
primarily through state legislation that must be submitted for federal review
in the form of a State Implementation Plan.32 The failure of a state to pass
legislation to the satisfaction of the federal government may result in

25. A useful compendium of the various federal statutes discussed in text is FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS (West Publishing Co. ed., 1993).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988).
27. Id. § 4332(c).
28.42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
29. 195-95, 91 Stat. 685; Pub. L. No. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1404; Pub. L. No. 97-375, 966 Stat.
1820 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
30. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671g
(Supp. V. 1993)).

31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f(Supp. V 1993).
32. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring state implementation plans
for ambient air quality standards); 42 U.S.C. § 74121 (Supp. V 1993) (requiring state
implementation plans for hazardous air pollutants).
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imposition of a Federal Implementation Plan, 33 as well as sanctions that
include the cutoff of highway construction funds34 and punitive cutbacks in

allowable emissions. 35 The federal Clean Air Act is the most expensive of
the federal environmental regulatory programs to date.
The Clean Water Act36 regulates the discharge of pollutants into waters
of the United States. Passed in 1972, the Clean Water Act has not yet been
significantly amended, although amending legislation was proposed but not
passed in the 103rd Congress. Like the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act
is implemented through state permitting programs, here called the National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit program.37 Unlike the Clean
Air Act, however, the Clean Water Act has no State Implementation Plans.
Instead, the federal government prescribes water quality standards that the
states must achieve. The Clean Water Act is also a principal vehicle for
funding municipal wastewater treatment plants. Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act38 serves as authority for federal regulation of approximately 100
million acres of wetlands.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 39 prescribes a
"cradle-to-grave" program for the management of hazardous waste. Drums
of hazardous waste must be labeled, manifested, and tracked to their ultimate
place of disposal. Treatment, storage, and disposal facilities must obtain
RCRA permits and comply with stringent regulations concerning their
construction, allowable wastes, groundwater monitoring, closure plans, and
financial responsibility. RCRA permitting programs are often delegated to
states, which often impose additional requirements with regard to handling
hazardous wastes.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act' differs from the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and RCRA
in that it is a liability scheme rather than a permitting program. CERCLA
imposes liability upon the owner, operator, transporter, or arranger for the
disposal of hazardous substances whenever those substances are released into
the environment.4" Comprehensively overhauled in 1986 by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA),42 the statute imposes strict,

33. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b) (Supp. V 1993).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993).

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
33 U.S.C.§ 1344 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

42. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42

U.S.C.).
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joint, and several liability for cleanup costs. Those costs may be recovered
by the federal government or innocent third parties. CERCLA also provides
injunctive authority to the federal government to require private parties to
clean up their sites,43 and involves the federal government in the design and
implementation of cleanup programs.'
Most states also have their own
cleanup programs and mini-superfunds.
The Oil Pollution Act of 199045 was passed as a result of the 11 milliongallon Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska. The Act
imposes liability upon the owners and operators of vessels or facilities from
which oil is released46 and requires the preparation of extensive oil-spill
contingency plans to guarantee readiness in the event of a serious oil spill.47
In addition to national regulations, many states have adopted their own oil- and
chemical-spill response programs to supplement the federal program.
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,'4 administered by the Surface Mining Office of the Interior Department, requires the
reclamation of surface-mine lands to conditions approximating their original
natural contours. Penalties assessed by the act are deposited in the Abandoned
Mineland Reclamation Fund for reclamation of orphan sites. This regulation
also has many state-enacted counterparts.
The Endangered Species Act of 197341 forbids the "taking" of any
species of plant or animal listed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service as
endangered, including disturbance of the habitat of that species. The Clinton
administration has suggested the act should be broadened to include protection
of the ecosystem upon which the endangered species (as well as other species)
depends." Severe civil and criminal penalties may be imposed for violations
of the statute. 1 Most states have species protection statutes of their own.
The Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 197252 governs
the disposal of sewage, sludge, and other waste into the ocean. Most coastal
states have various kinds of shoreline and coastal protection laws. 53 The

43. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9605-9606 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
45. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (Supp. V 1993).
46. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (Supp. V 1993).

47. 33 U.S.C. § 2732(a) (Supp. V 1993).
48. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
49. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
50. See, e.g., Gary Lee, U.S., State Issue Planto PaidNorthern California's Environment,
WASH. PosT. December 16, 1994, at A20; Tom Kenworthy, Babbitt Clears Compromise to
Protect CaliforniaBird, WASH. POST, March 26, 1993, at A2.
1. 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
52. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
53. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -390 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1993).
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Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972"s requires states to adopt plans for the
protection of their coastlines and coastal waters.
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Acte 6 requires
testing, registration, and labeling of pesticides. The Toxic Substances Control
Act5 7 requires the registration and testing of new chemicals. The Public
Health Safety Act, including the Safe Drinking Water Act58 regulates small,
private water-distribution systems, and provides standards for public water
systems. This law is supplemented by state health laws requiring testing and
safety standards for municipal water systems and drinking-water wells.
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Acte9 deals
with planning for environmental catastrophes.
As noted, the fifty states have adopted environmental protection schemes
of greater or lesser complexity that mirror these federal statutes, and are
adapted to the states' own ecological, economic, and social needs. Some of
these programs are federally mandated, while others are purely "homegrown."
The variety and peculiarities of state environmental regulation cannot be
catalogued here; suffice it to say that, in many instances, it is the state
regulatory scheme rather than the federal that most directly touches the people
in this country on a day-to-day basis.
We have seen that a number of federal environmental statutes set
minimums (or "floors") for state environmental protection on the rationale that
states should not be allowed to create "pollution havens" where industry may
flee to avoid environmental regulation. These federal statutes, however,
provide states with substantial flexibility in determining how they will achieve
compliance with federal requirements, and allow them to adopt more stringent
regulations than those already federally mandated. Thus, while states are
required to prepare State Implementation Plans to be submitted to the federal
government for approval under the Clean Air Act, state air pollution control
laws often reach far beyond federal requirements. States such as California,
New York, and Colorado have highly specialized air pollution regulations to
address their unique and very different climatic conditions, geographies, and
population distributions. Likewise, programs for controlling water pollution,
wetlands, nonmunicipal drinking-water supplies, underground injection, and
other treatment or disposal programs for hazardous waste must also be
conducted in accordance with federal regulations.
Mine-land bonding and reclamation, application of agricultural chemicals,
and protection of groundwater, however, are effectively "state-led" programs

55. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988).
56. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 to 136y (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1988).
59. Id. §§ 11,001-11,050.
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where the federal government defers to local authorities, judging them to be
more appropriate regulators of such activities. State "mini-superfunds,"
"SEPA" (versus "NEPA") requirements, recycling laws, labeling rules, and
"community right-to-know" requirements are further examples of state
analogies to federal statutes that either embroider the federal regulatory
program or extend to activities not previously regulated.
Public health and safety traditionally has been the domain of the states
rather than the federal government. But recent years have seen significant
federal encroachment upon this formerly exclusive preserve of the states.
Zoning and land-use restrictions on private property also are essential
functions of state and local government that have been the target of recent
federal incursions (most notably wetlands regulation). States have recently
expanded their land-use regulations to include historic preservation,'
battlefield protection,6' scenic designations,62 setbacks along waterways and
streams,63 farmland protection,' establishment of "greenways,"65 designation of parks and preserves,' and restrictions on natural resource development.67 These regulations have been linked with outright prohibitions
relating to environmental, cultural, aesthetic, historical, and other considerations.
Finally, licensing and permitting schemes, economic incentives, and
taxation also are used by state and local governments as a means of.encouraging or discouraging certain economic activities affecting the environment.
Taken together with a comprehensive battery of federal, state, and local
regulations that are directly applicable to activities affecting the environment
and land use, these policies can effectively prohibit or even eliminate many
otherwise feasible and productive activities.
III. "ENVIRONMENTAL TAKINGS": THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL PROTECTION

Environmental regulation is the newest and most extensive governmental
regulatory program yet conceived. Economic activities that were formerly
considered acceptable-even laudable-have been labeled undesirable over the
past few decades. In many instances they have even become unlawful.
Examples of new offenses include air conditioning, draining swamps,

60. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 11-68-1 to -15, (Michie 1994); ARIz. REV. STAT.
164 (Supp. 1994).
61. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. 4-11-501 to -506 (Supp. 1994).
62. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 41.21.131 (1993).
63. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 55-5 (West Supp. 1995).
64. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-3201 to -3204 (1991).
65. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 253.7810 to -7828 (West Supp. 1995).
66. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 9-2-3 (Michie 1987).
67. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 369.305 (West Supp. 1995).
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reformulated gasolines, the installation of asbestos as a fire retardant, and
improving farm productivity through the use of chemical fertilizers and
pesticides.
Much of this regulation is predicated on incomplete or developing
scientific knowledge for which consensus does not yet exist. It also is
predicated on philosophical and aesthetic tenets that are not necessarily
universal and are, in many instances, conflicting and self-contradictory. Not
surprisingly, some people have raised the legitimate question: How far can
government go in the name of environmental protection?
As discussed below, the courts have used the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to place some constitutional limits on what government can do.
Those limits, however, still leave property owners vulnerable to uncompensated "environmental takings."
A. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: "[N]or shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 6 8 It
recognizes the authority of the government to take private property for public
use such as the construction of highways, hospitals, and military facilities.
Such takings are conditioned on the requirement that "just compensation" be
paid to the owner of the property. The taking of private property by the
government for public use without just compensation is thus unconstitutional
and void.69
The government traditionally acquires property from private parties
through the condemnation process. This legal process provides for an explicit
exchange of money for title to the land, adhering scrupulously to the
requirements of the Takings Clause. Americans are accustomed to a system
of justice where private property that is taken by the government is paid for
no matter how lofty the goals of the government project or how wealthy the
owner of the property. By analogy, when the government assumes physical
possession of property without demanding the passage of legal title, the owner
also is entitled to just compensation." The rule applies whether the entire
property or a mere possessory interest is taken, and whether the taking is a
temporary or permanent one.
Thus, in KaiserAetna v. United States"1 the owner of a private waterway
was entitled to recover the value of a navigational servitude asserted on behalf

68. U.S. CONST., amend. V.
69. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
70. United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (finding that government seizure
of coal mine during wartime constitutes a taking).
71. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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of the public by the United States. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.7' Justice Thurgood Marshall described the constitutionally
protected liberty embodied in the Takings Clause, writing:
Property rights in a physical thing have been described as the rights "to
possess, use and dispose of it." To the extent that the government
permanently occupies physical property, it effectively destroys each of
these rights. First, the owner has no right to possess the occupied space
himself, and also has no power to exclude the occupier from possession
and use of the space. The power to exclude has traditionally been
considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of
property rights. Second, the permanent physical occupation of property
forever denies the owner any power to control the use of the property; he
not only cannot exclude others, but can make no nonpossessory use of the
property. Although deprivation of the right to use and obtain a profit from
property is not, in every case, independently sufficient to establish a
taking, it is clearly relevant. Finally, even though the owner may retain
the bare legal right to dispose of the occupied space by transfer or sale, the
permanent occupation of that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the
right of any value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make any use
of the property. 73
Nor is physical invasion in the name of the environment exempt from the
just-compensation requirement of the Takings Clause. In Hendler v. United
States7 4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that
a landowner is entitled to recover just compensation for government's
occupancy of a portion of his land by groundwater monitoring wells drilled in
connection with the cleanup of a Superfund site:
The notion of exclusive ownership as a property right is fundamental
to our theory of social organization. In addition to its central role in
protecting the individual's right to be let alone, the importance of exclusive
ownership-the ability to exclude freeriders-is now understood as
essential to economic development, and to the avoidance of the wasting of
resources found under common property systems.
The intruder who enters clothed in the robes of authority in broad
daylight commits no less an invasion of these rights than if he sneaks in
the night wearing a burglar's mask. In some ways, entry by the authorities is more to be feared, since the citizen's right to defend against the

72. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
73. Id. at 435-36 (citations omitted).
74. 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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intrusion may seem less clear. Courts should leave no doubt as to whose
side the law stands upon. 74
Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1868,
establishes that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."' In 1897 the Supreme Court held that this
extended the Fifth Amendment's protections against takings to the states as
well as the federal government.76
B. Government Regulation and "EnvironmentalTakings"
The Takings Clause is "designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole."' The Clause has proved to be an
especially important restraint upon the government's exercise of regulatory
authority, even though that exercise almost always is predicated upon
principles of the public good and general welfare. As Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., put it, "The general rule at least is, that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
78
a taking."
The "regulatory taking," while posing special analytic problems, does not
differ in constitutional terms from takings by condemnation or physical
invasion.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that private property shall not "be
taken for public use, without just compensation." This constitutional
guarantee is more than just a limitation against the physical seizure or
invasion of property by the government in the name of the public good.
The Fifth Amendment also provides just compensation against governmental regulations which effectively accomplish the same destructive end.79
Accordingly, courts have held that the just compensation requirement of the
Fifth Amendment entitles an owner to compensation where his property has
been taken under a variety of environmental regimes: wetlands, ° Super-

74. Id. at 1375 (citations omitted).
75. U.S. CONsT., amend. XIV.
76. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
77. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
78. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
79. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 385 (1988).
80. Id. See also Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987). For important further proceedings in these two cases, see
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Florida Rock Indus.
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fund," the Endangered Species Act,8 3 the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act,' flood plain protection,' and coastal zone conserva86
tion.
Mining and mineral extraction, being the subject of pervasive environmental regulation, likewise has served as a significant battleground between
the government and the owners of private property. In Whitney Benefits, Inc.
v. United States 7 the owner of a Wyoming coal deposit was awarded more
than $60 million because the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
forbade extraction of the coal. The seminal case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon"5 invalidated an antisubsidence statute, and in United Nuclear Corp.
v. United States 9 the refusal of the Secretary of the Interior to approve a
plan of operations of a uranium mine on Indian land was claimed to entitle the
owner of the mineral lease to just compensation.
Several other recent regulatory takings cases in the federal courts also
bear mention. Since 1978 the Supreme Court has identified at least three areas
that constitute per se violations of the Fifth Amendment. In Hodel v. Irving'
the Court held that the destruction of the right to devise private property
violates the Fifth Amendment. In Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission9"
the Court determined that a property regulation which does not substantially
advance its avowed governmental purpose also constitutes a taking. In Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council' the Court held that destruction of all
productive and beneficial uses of private property by prohibiting construction
within a coastal zone violated the Fifth Amendment. The most recent
pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the issue of property rights, Dolan
v. City of Tigard,93 suggests that such rights will no longer be accorded less
protection than other civil rights: "We see no reason why the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First

v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994),petitionfor cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3146 (U.S.
Sept. 19, 1994) (No. 94-511).
82. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
83. Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989).
84. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
85. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
86. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
87. 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989), modified, 20 Cl. Ct. 324 (1990), aff'd, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied,502 U.S. 952 (1991).
88. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
89. 912 F.2d 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1990), (settled on remand).
90. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
91. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
92. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
93. 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994).
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Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor
relation in these comparable circumstances." 9' In Nixon v. United States'
the D.C. Circuit spoke extensively of property rights as a complex network of
reasonable expectations, social and historical custom, and the government's
regulatory authority.
State courts also are beginning to scrutinize environmental takings. A
recent example involved the federal criminal law and state regulatory codes
that make it a crime to develop private property if a pair of bald eagles are
building a nest, even if the eagles later abandon the nest. 96 Relief from these
pervasive restrictions came in Flotilla, Inc. v. Florida,9' where the state
circuit court for Manatee County, Florida, found that these statutes effected
a taking for which the landowner was entitled just compensation: "The taking
in this case is not a regulatory taking. The best description is perhaps an
'environmental taking'. . . . [T]he State effectively created a habitat for the
eagles, and empowered the eagles to decide which land would be taken."9 s
Equally important cases for property rights are those involving neither
federal nor state environmental takings, but local zoning and historic
preservation statutes. In United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of
99 a dispute arose when the Philadelphia
Philadelphia
Historical Commission
designated the Boyd Theater as an historic site. As a result, the building's
owners were required to maintain the facility to commission standards at their
own expense or face criminal penalties."° United Artists petitioned the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court for relief. In 1991, the court ruled that
Philadelphia's historical preservation system was "unfair, unjust, and
amount[ed] to an unconstitutional taking without just compensation .... ",01
As a result of strenuous protests from the state attorney general, state
representatives, the National Historic Trust, and others, the court agreed to
rehear the case. On November 9, 1993, the court held no taking had
occurred, although it found for the owners on different grounds." 2 This

94. Id. at 2320.
95. 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
96. FLA. STAT. § 372.0725 (1989).
97. 636 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 645 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1994).
98. Id. at 764.
99. 595 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1991), rev'd, 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993).
100. Id. at 11.
101. Id. at 13-14.
102. 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993). On reargument, the court reversed its previous ruling and held
that "the designation of a building as historic without the consent of the owner is not a 'taking'
that requires just compensation." Id. at 614. The court nonetheless reached the same result as
before by holding that the Historical Commission exceeded its legal authority in designating the
interior of the building as historic and vacating the entire historic designation. Id.
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case is significant because Philadelphia's historic preservation system is typical
of many across the country.
Despite these recent rulings, the application of the Takings Clause to
claims of regulatory taking remains an uncertain enterprise the outcome of
which is heavily dependent upon the presiding judge and the facts of the
particular case. 13 As Justice Brennan summed it up in an oft-quoted
passage:
While this Court has recognized that the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee.
[is] designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole," this Court, quite simply, has been unable to
develop any "set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness"
require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by
the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a
few persons. Indeed, we have frequently observed that whether a
particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure
to pay for any losses proximately caused1 by
it depends largely "upon the
4
particular circumstances [in that] case." 0
Moreover, the ability of a property owner to prevail in a regulatory takings
case remains the exception rather than the rule. Such litigation is a long and
arduous process that only the most well-financed and dedicated property owner
is able to endure.
In sum, the scales of justice are unfairly tipped in favor of the government
when citizens are faced with the threat of losing their property because of
regulatory burdens. Not only are the laws drafted to ease the litigation burden
placed on the government, but the cost of takings litigation can range from
$50,000 to $500,000 or more, which is too great a burden for the average
citizen to bear. The government, on the other hand, does not face a similar
shortage of resources in comparison to the individual property owner, and
often can pursue the taking without constraint. Adding to the hardship,
procedural hurdles can bar litigation on the merits of takings claims for
anywhere from five to ten years. Thus, when faced with a government takings
claim, many property owners choose not to pursue their rights under the Fifth
Amendment.
Since the protection afforded property rights by the courts has not been
satisfactory, property owners have turned to the federal and state legislative
branches for help.

103. See generallyRogerJ. Marzulla& Nancie G. Marzulla, Regulatory Takings in the Clains
Court: Adjusting the Burdens That in Fairnessand Equity Ought to be Borne by Society as a
Whole, 40 CATH. U. L. Rav. 549 (1991).
104. Pennsylvania Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
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IV. FEDERAL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS
TO PROTECT PROPERTY RIGHTS

A. Executive Order No. 12,360
It being evident that the courts were failing to protect private property
rights adequately, the White House decided to step into the fray in 1988.
President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12,630, "Governmental Actions
and Interference With Constitutionally-Protected Property Rights."105 E.O.
12,630 recognizes that the government can, short of the formal exercise of its
eminent domain authority, acquire private property through regulation or
"inverse condemnation." Modeled after requirements for "Environmental
Impact Analysis" under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970, E.O.
12,630 requires "Takings Impact Analysis" of most government regulations
to prevent unnecessary takings and to budget for compensation for those
actions necessarily involving takings. 06 The order provides for an accounting of the takings implications of government regulations, but does not
necessarily hinder the enforcement of any environmental or other governmental program.
The purpose of the executive order is "to assist Federal departments and
agencies in. . . proposing, planning, and implementing actions with due
regard for the constitutional protections provided by the Fifth Amendment"
and "to reduce the risk of undue or inadvertent burdens on the public fisc
resulting from lawful government actions. " " The Attorney General, in
consultation with executive departments and agencies, is responsible for
promulgating "Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of
Unanticipated Takings."108 The touchstone for formulating these guidelines
is current Supreme Court decisions. Executive Order No. 12,630 does not
enlarge or fix the scope or definition of regulatory takings. The Fifth
Amendment itself still sets the floor upon which government may exercise its
power in ways that adversely affect private property rights. E.O. 12,630
requires decisionmakers to ascertain whether a proposed action will activate
the Constitution's guarantee that private property not be taken for public use
without just compensation. The head of each executive department or agency
must designate an official who is responsible for ensuring compliance with the

105. 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1988).
106. See generally Roger J. Marzulla, The New "Takings "Executive OrderandEnvironmental
Regulation-Collisionor Cooperation?, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,254, 10,258 (July 1988). Mr.
Marzuila, the chief architect of the executive order, served as Assistant Attorney General for the
then-Land and Natural Resources Division of the United States Department of Justice in the
Reagan administration.
107. Exec. Order No. 12,630, § 1(c), 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1988).
108. Id.
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order, and agencies must report identified takings implications and actual
takings claims to the Office of Management and Budget for planning and
budgetary purposes.
Despite the clear wording of E.O. 12,630, CongressDaily reports that it
"has gone mostly unused, " " especially by the Clinton administration.
Increasingly, property owners are coming to realize that if their Fifth
Amendment rights are to have real effect, still more must be done. That
"more" means legislation.
B. Federal "Takings" Legislation
Federal takings legislation, unfortunately, has met with hostile and
effective opposition. But the proliferation of these bills in recent years, and
the drama surrounding them, makes their progress worth recounting.
With the encouragement of the growing property rights movement, some
members of Congress have attempted to codify the procedural property rights
protections of E.O. 12,630 into federal statute. In 1990, Senator Steve Symms
of Idaho introduced the first "private property" provision (modeled after E.O.
12,630) into an agriculture bill, but it narrowly failed by a vote of 52 to
43. "' The following year, Symms introduced a separate "takings bill," once
again based on E.O. 12,630."' The bill required all federal agencies to
conduct a takings
review of regulations before their promulgation. Under it, no regulation
would become effective until the Attorney General certified that the issuing
agency was complying with E.O. 12,630. This bill was also defeated.
Two years later-the day after Bill Clinton was sworn in as President of
the United States-then-Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole of Kansas
introduced his own version of Symms' bill, the "Private Property Rights Act
of 1993."'
He attempted to attach his bill as an amendment to Senator
John Glenn's bill to elevate the Environmental Protection Agency to cabinet
status. Like the Symms takings bill, Dole's amendment would prohibit any
federal regulation from becoming effective until the Attorney General certified
that the regulation complied with the terms of E.O. 12,630.
The Clinton administration waged a vigorous fight to kill the Dole
amendment. Vice President Gore wrote,

109. EPA Measure Faces Hit on "Takings," NAT'L J.'S CONGRESS DAILY/A.M., Apr. 26,
1993, at 1.

110. S. 2830, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
111. S. 50, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
112. S. 177, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Recently, another version of Dole's property rights
bill, cosponsored with Senator Howell Heflin of Alabama, was successfully added to the Senate
version reauthorization of the Safe Drinking Water Act. S. 2019, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
This reauthorization has not passed, however.
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I feel strongly, as you know, that this amendment should not be adopted,
precisely because, among other things, it would greatly hamper the
Administration's ability to fashion its own approach to regulatory review
and instead, force us to adhere chapter and verse1 3to a key element of the
1
last administration's regulatory review program.
He concluded, "We are considering every aspect of regulatory review,
including how to treat the outstanding executive order on 'takings.' We
strongly urge that any amendment to codify that order or otherwise to preempt
the administration's review be rejected. " "' In similar fashion, Attorney
General Janet Reno wrote Senator Glenn, "We believe. . . that freezing this
Executive Order into law would be unwise. Codifying the Order as it stood
in 1991 would prevent this and any future administrations from revising the
Order. . . . [This legislation represents an unnecessary incursion upon the
executive authority of the President
. "is Neither the Dole amendment
or the Glenn bill passed.
Similar legislation to protect private property was introduced in the House
of Representatives. Representative Gerald Solomon of New York introduced
the House companion to Senator Dole's bill. 6 Meanwhile, Representative
Gary Condit of California introduced the "Private Property Protection Act of
1993 " 117 to require that federal agencies establish procedures for assessing
whether federal regulations might result in takings of private property, and to
require the Secretary of Agriculture to report to Congress on the effect this act
would have on agriculture.
Other legislation in the House would have gone beyond the procedural
requirements of E.O. 12,630. Representative Robert F. Smith of Oregon
introduced the "Just Compensation Act of 1993 " i' to require the head of
any federal agency who takes an action under the Endangered Species Act, the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, specified portions of the
National Trails Systems Act, or the Clean Water Act relating to wetlands to
compensate the owner of private property for any diminution in value caused
by the action. Representative Lamar Smith of Texas introduced legislation in
1994 to require federal agencies to notify property owners of regulations
restricting use of their property." 9 The landowner is given ninety days to

113. Senate to Take Up CabinetBill Today, Debate on Wetlands, Rights, NAT. ENv. DAILY
(BNA) May 4, 1993.
114. Nancie G. Marzulla, Dole PropertyRightsAmendment Fails, LAND RIGHTS LETTER, June
1993, at 2.
115. Id. at 5.
116. H.R. 385, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
117. H.R. 561, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
118. H.R. 1388, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
119. H.R. 3784, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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request compensation, after which the agency has ninety days to offer to buy
the property or pay the owner the amount the property was devalued.
Near the end of the 103rd Congress, when property rights became a
stronger issue, many other members of Congress began to introduce legislation
of their own. Senator Phil Gramm of Texas introduced the strongest property
rights bill to date, requiring the government to pay just compensation to the
owners of land that is devalued by twenty-five percent or more (or $10,000 or
more) due to government regulation. Responding to the listing of the goldencheeked warbler as threatened-a Yhove that would affect thirty-three Texas
counties-Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson introduced legislation preventing any
further listing of any species
or habitat under the Endangered Species Act until
20
that act is reauthorized.1
Because of strong opposition by the White House and congressional
leaders, none of these bills has succeeded. The blockading of such legislation
is a clear indicator of how the federal government is turning its back on the
Constitution. During the floor debate on his bill, Senator Dole addressed the
issue in stark terms:
Our Founding Fathers deeply believed in the right of American citizens to
hold private property and that Government should not invade upon that
right. . . . When I introduced S. 177, I mentioned that its intention
might seem curious-requiring Federal employees to uphold the Constitution-an activity in which they swore to engage before they were hired.
Maybe we should get everyone in Government to take an oath every year
so they would not forget.' 2
With one possible exception," then, the only "progress" property
rights proponents made in the 103rd Congress was to block environmental
legislation. Property rights amendments were attached to every regulatory
reauthorization going through the House of Representatives and Senate,
causing their sponsors to pull their bills from further consideration. Secretary
of the Interior Bruce Babbitt's bill to make his National Biological Survey was
loaded with so many amendments that he opted to create and fund his numberone priority without congressional approval.

120. S. 2451, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
121. 139 CONG. REC. S5337 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1993) (statement of Sen. Dole).
122. The exception was the eleventh-hour passage of a property rights rider to the California
Desert Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat. 4471 (1994). While the act itself is a
setback to property owners (it prohibits development on 6.4 million acres of desert land in
California, including 700,000 acres of private land needed for the preserve), the rider at least
prohibits federal officials involved in eminent domain proceedings from using the presence of the
desert tortoise and other endangered and threatened species to snap up the acreage at cut-rate
prices. Id. § 710, 108 Stat. 4501.
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Amendments relating to property rights, risk assessment, and controlling
unfunded mandates, thanks to a lobbyist's memorandum to environmental
leaders, became known as "the unholy trinity.""
That memorandum
indicated that the environmentalists had spread themselves too thin, and that
their chances of passing legislation without the reforms of the trinity were
slim.
Opposition to property rights demonstrates not only how far Washington
has strayed from the intentions of the Founders, but also how far it is from the
will of the American people. Frustrated by the refusal of the courts and the
federal government to acknowledge the requirements of the Fifth Amendment,
property owners have turned to the state legislatures for relief.
V. STATE LEGISLATION: A NEW HOPE

It is at the state level that property owners have become most active in
efforts to protect their rights from the "green machine." Across the nation,
citizens are demanding the enactment of state property rights legislation. In
reaction to this demand, state legislators are proposing two main types of
property rights legislation: (1) planning bills, and (2) bills that identify a
numerical percentage of diminution in value that triggers the constitutional
requirement of just compensation.
A. Planning or "Look Before You Leap" Bills
Like proposed federal property rights bills, state planning bills are
modeled after Executive Order No. 12,630. Just as the executive order does
for the federal government, planning bills require state governments to "look
before they leap" in regard to actions that might result in unconstitutional
takings of private property. In just three years, more than sixty planning bills,
usually dubbed "Private Property Protection Acts," have been introduced at
the state level. 11 Six states have signed property rights legislation of this
sort into law, and more than half the states now have property rights initiatives
under consideration. The National Law Journal calls this mounting wave
"The 'Property Rights' Revolt." 2 4

122. DraftLegislative Strategy PaperDeveloped by Environmental Groupd Lobbyists Dated
March 5, 1994 (Text), BNA, March 16, 1994.
123. Six planning bills have died in committee in various states. In three states, the bills have
been stopped by a governor's veto (Florida, Missouri, and Idaho). Idaho Governor Cecil B.
Andrus, Jimmy Carter's Secretary of Interior, has vetoed three such bills so far, but an override
vote is expected. Richard Miniter, Out to Change the Law of the Land, INSIGHT, May 2, 1993,
at 10.
124. Marianne Lavelle, The "PropertyRights" Revolt, NAT'L. L. J.,May 10, 1993, at 1.
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The governor of Washington vetoed a planning bill in 1990. The state
legislators, however, added it as an amendment to the Growth Management
Act of 1991, which did pass.'25 Delaware enacted the first stand alone
property rights law on January 21, 1992. That law establishes procedures for
assessing whether26proposed state rules and regulations result in a taking of
private property. 1
Arizona followed on June 1, 1992, with a planning bill similar to
Delaware's. A campaign labeling the Arizona bill "the worst anti-environmental law ever passed in the United States" 7 enabled the environmental lobby
to garner the 50,000 signatures necessary for a statewide referendum to repeal
the law. In a campaign rite with false allegations about the effects of property
rights legislation, Proposition 300 was defeated by a three-to-two margin.
Property rights supporters in the state legislature, who increased in numbers
during the same election, have promised to reintroduce strong legislation
during the current term.
Meanwhile, Utah passed a law even stronger than the one voted down in
Arizona over the strenuous opposition of the Utah Sierra Club and the
Audubon Council of Utah. 2 I Indiana requires its attorney general to alert
the governor of any proposed rule that might entail a taking. 2 9 A joint
resolution in Virginia has directed the creation of a joint subcommittee to
study and if necessary change state procedures affecting property rights. 30
B. The Fifty Percent Solution
Planning bills are not, as critics charge, "the worst anti-environmental
legislation ever passed in the United States," but they have serious weaknesses. As Maryland Attorney General Ralph S. Tyler points out, "no meaningful
analysis can be done" of the liability at stake in a taking when so much
depends not only "upon the particular circumstances" of the case, but on the
philosophy of the particular judge hearing the case. Justice Brennan admitted
the problem, namely the Supreme Court's failure "to develop any 'set formula'
for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. "131 The Court has refused
to define the terms "taking," "just compensation," "public use," and even

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

WAsH. REv. CODE § 36.70A.040 (Supp. 1994).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 605 (Supp. 1994).
Lavelle, supra note 126, at 34.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-90-1 to 63-90-4 (Supp. 1994).
IND. CODE § 4-22-2-32 (Supp. 1994).
1994 Va. Acts 74; 1993 Va. Acts 624.
Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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"private property." When judges take this ad hoc approach to takings law,
liability planning becomes a shot in the dark.
To address this problem, Defenders of Property Rights drafted a model
takings bill defining a taking as a diminution of value of fifty percent or more.
This becomes the statutory "trigger-point" at which a regulatory taking and
inverse condemnation will be presumed to occur. Thus, the model bill would
entitle property owners to automatic compensation upon proving that property
was diminished in value by fifty percent as a result of government regulation.
This "compensation" bill would not preclude property owners subject to
regulatory takings that fall short of the fifty percent trigger-point from legally
challenging regulatory action. Moreover, any regulatory action that reduces
the value of property must be reflected in the owner's property tax assessment
by the exact amount that the property
value is reduced. This type of bill has
132
been introduced in fifteen states.
In four states-California, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Washington-combination planning/compensation bills have been introduced. The
Mississippi bill, introduced in January 1994 in the Mississippi House (H.B.
1099), required that the property owner be compensated whenever the value
of property is reduced by forty percent due to any "regulation, rule or
guideline" promulgated for aesthetic or environmental purposes.
The
Mississippi Senate bill (S.B. 2005) defined a taking as a forty percent
reduction in the value of property caused by "any regulatory program."
Environmentalists fought the bill with every arrow in their quiver, fomenting
concerns that local citizens would become powerless to zone the location of
pornography shops if the bill passed.13 The bill also was attacked as being
racially motivated against blacks. So powerful was this fear that every black
representative and senator voted against the bill. Despite this full-court press,
the bill was defeated on a technicality rather than the merits of the environmentalist arguments. In its wake, a compensation bill was passed, albeit one
covering only regulations that prohibit harvesting forests.
C. Criticisms of PropertyRights Legislation
The environmental establishment regards private property protection laws
of either the planning or compensation variety as a threat to environmental
protection. The National Wildlife Federation worries that planning bills will
"impose higher costs on state agencies," and the Wilderness Society claims

132. The states are California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
and Washington.
133. Sharon Ebner, BattleBrews Over 'PropertyRights'Law, THE SUN HERALD, January 19,
1994, at Al.
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they "will end up costing taxpayers millions of dollars."1 34 The environmentalists' solution is to refuse to compensate individuals for takings, concentrating
these same millions of dollars of costs upon the unlucky few.
"If the government is required in case after case to reward financially any
party adversely affected by any environmental regulation, it [takings law]
becomes the proverbial Damoclean sword hanging over environmental law,"
says Albert H. Myerhoff, an attorney for the Natural Resources Defense
Council. 35 "The reality is that the state simply cannot afford to pay off
every landowner for every land-use decision," writes Terry J. Harris in
Chesapeake, the newsletter of the Potomac, Maryland, chapter of the Sierra
Club. 3
"So, should the legislative strategy [for passing Maryland's
planning law] prevail, state and local governments are likely to throw out
environmental protections as a too-expensive legal liability."137 Of course,
the Takings Clause is a sword that cuts out only those takings (environmental
or otherwise) for which the public is unwilling to pay-the exact intention of
its authors.
Thus, the environmental establishment's opposition betrays a fundamental
ignorance about the nature of property rights legislation. These bills do not
require the payment of just compensation for takings; the Constitution already
does that. Planning bills merely require state agencies to assess the takings
implications of their regulations before they are adopted. By requiring
governments to "look before they leap," they reduce the likelihood that
citizens will get stuck footing the bills for multimillion dollar awards. Far
from increasing costs, these bills actually save taxpayers money. It is worth
noting that not one state having enacted property rights protection laws has
experienced the doomsday scenario of neglect and cost explosion foretold by
environmentalists.
Despite the claims of the environmentalists, even compensation bills
would not increase the net social cost of environmental regulation involving
takings. By establishing an objective definition of takings, they would simply
ensure that the cost be spread among the general public rather than, to repeat
Justice Brennan's words, "forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a

whole. "138
It should be recognized that some property-rights advocates object to
compensation bills. They are concerned that, by setting a threshold,

134. Nancie G. Marzulla, Who Benefits from State Private Property Regulation? You, the
Taxpayer and Citizen, LAND RIGHTS LETTER, June 1993, at 4.
135. W. John Moore, Just Compensation, NAT'L J., June 13, 1992, at 1405.
136.
137. Miniter, supra note 123, at 10.
138. Pennsylvania Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123
(1978).
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compensation bills might disparage the rights of property owners who are the
victims of takings that fall below that threshold. To the contrary, as discussed
above, compensation bills would not prevent property owners from obtaining
compensation for takings that reduce property value by less than fifty percent.
Such bills would simply require that once a taking crosses this threshold, the
government must condemn and buy the property outright or pay the owner
compensation for the loss in property value. While clarifying and mandating
a compensation process for victims of takings that exceed the threshold,
compensation bills would in no way impair the ability of property owners to
obtain compensation for lesser takings.
A final criticism of compensation bills is that they are arbitrary. Why set
the trigger point at fifty percent of property value? Why not higher or lower?
Isn't that an arbitrary threshold? The fifty percent threshold is, to a degree,
arbitrary. But the root problem in takings jurisprudence has been the inability
of the courts to define a "taking." To resolve this problem, a statutory
definition is needed. The only possible definitions that would not be arbitrary
would be to (1) require condemnation proceedings for any diminution of value
at all (even a fraction of a cent), or (2) to permit the government to take
everything without compensation. The first choice is politically impractical,
and the second means no limits on takings at all. Given the choice between
an arbitrary limit and none, we must opt for a limit. The advantage of a fifty
percent threshold over any arbitrary threshold is that at this point the
government has taken as much value as the property owner retains. When that
happens, the government legitimately may be expected to pay for the taking.
Some states may enact thresholds lower than fifty percent. This should
not be discouraged-each state can establish its preferred threshold regarding
takings. Even a federal compensation bill that concerned takings by the states
and the federal government need not interfere with such federalist diversity.
A federal law requiring condemnation or compensation for takings exceeding
a given threshold would not curtail the ability of any state to set a lower
threshold for takings by the state government.
Planning and compensation bills make sense. In particular, the criticisms
of the major environmental groups are misplaced. "What we're seeing is a
concerted, multifaceted effort to use the state forum to pursue the antienvironmental agenda," says John D. Eschaverria, chief legal counsel of the
National Audubon Society. 139 "An increasingly militant property rights
movement," writes a Sierra Club official, "is poised to reverse decades of
environmental progress." 14 The truth is that the environmental movement
and regulatory takings are blithely exposing taxpayers to millions of dollars in

139. Lavelle, supra note 124, at 1.
140. Miniter, supra note 123, at 11.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

25

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:613

liability, which is the surest way of destroying public support for genuine
environmental conservation.
VI. CONCLUSION: PROPERTY RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS

While much of the angst and anger in the property rights movement is
directed against the organized environmentalist establishment and its lobbyists,
private property institutions support rational environmental conservation.
Many property rights leaders are prominent conservationists. Dayton 0.
Hyde, for example, started Operation Stronghold after he lost the use of his
property because he created a wildlife habitat that made the property subject
to wetlands protection regulations.'" Bill Ellen, a Greenpeace and World
Wildlife Fund supporter and founder of the nonprofit wildlife rescue center
Wild Care, became involved in the property rights movement after being
prosecuted and jailed for allegedly violating wetlands regulations while
creating wetlands.' 45 Ann Corcoran, a former National Audubon Society
lobbyist, started the Land Rights Letter after the federal government classified
a neighbor's land as wetlands, preventing a planned development.' 46
The notion that private property itself is "anti-environmental" is flatly
wrong. To appreciate the importance of the institutions of private ownership
in maintaining a healthy environment, one need only look at the unprecedented
environmental catastrophe produced in Eastern Europe by the absence of such
institutions. In the United States, private lands are far better managed
ecologically than those run by the government. The "commons" are always
at the mercy of politically powerful special interests with no stake in the land.
Exclusive ownership and liability create the only effective incentives to
conserve resources and minimize pollution. A property owner who blights his
land destroys his own estate and that of his heirs; when a bureaucrat blights
"public" land, he bears none of the cost. When land belongs to everyone, it

144. See Siok-Hian Tay Kelley, Glendora Group Shapes Land to Save Wildlife Environment,
Los ANGELES TIMES, December 7, 1989, at J4; Jim Stiak, Oregon WriterDaytonHyde Preaches
"HolisticRanching," THE OREGONIAN, July 30, 1989, Northwest Magazine at 12; Rogers
Worthington, Mustang Meadows: Wild HorsesFeel At Home on This Range, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
June 28, 1989, at A6.
145. Md. Wetlands Conviction StirringHeatedDebate, WASH. POST, February 20, 1993, at
F6; H. Jane Lehman, A ChangingTide on Wetlands Decisions Violators Caughtin a Tug of War
Over PropertyRights, EnvironmentalProtection,WASH. POST, January 18, 1992, at El.
146. See Mary Corey, 'Wise Use'AdvocatesTake on Environmentalists,BALTIMORE MORNING
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actually belongs to no one. This is the source of the "tragedy of the commons." 147
Experience teaches that uncompensated takings in the name of environmentalism often create perverse disincentives that are themselves antienvironmental in effect. If the price of creating habitat is losing property
without compensation, who will create habitat? The property rights movement
is not seeking less environmental protection; it asks only that a few unlucky
landowners no longer be forced to bear an unfair share of the burden imposed
by such regulations.
More fundamentally, the underlying assumption is that taxpayers are
unwilling to bear the enormous cost of environmental takings, suggesting an
acknowledgment that at least some such takings do not really serve an
overriding public interest. If the public will oppose a taking once it learns of
the cost, why foist this cost on a defenseless minority?
When any faction, including the organized environmental movement, is
able to serve its interests at the expense of a politically weaker group, it may
lobby more successfully for takings that, although of dubious public benefit,
appear "free" to taxpayers. In contrast, when the costs are borne by the
taxpayers, the putative benefits come under voter scrutiny and are weighed
against those costs. Regulations are most cost-effective when the party to
14
whom the alleged benefit accrues, in this case the public, bears the cost. 1
Ultimately, however, uncompensated taking is not just a problem of
economic efficiency, but of justice. This danger was outlined by Chief Justice
Holmes in 1922:
The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes
that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for
such use without compensation. . . . When this seemingly absolute
protection is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural
tendency of human nature is to extend that qualification more and more
until at last private property disappears. 49
In his 1985 book, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
Domain, Professor Richard Epstein argues that property is the barrier between
the individual and the naked power of the state; it is the guarantor of all other
rights, including freedom of speech. 50 How many will speak out, he asks,
if the government can take everything you have?

147. See Jerry Ellig, The Economics of Regulatory Takings, 46 S.C. L. REv. 595 (1995).
148. These "public choice" aspects of regulatory takings are discussed in Ellig, supra note
147, and Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The ContinuingNeed for Reform, 46 S.C. L.
REV. 579 (1995).
149. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
150. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN, 137-39 (1985).
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Property can be likened to an orange. Government regulation can crush
out the meat, juice, and pulp of property use and value-leaving the owner
only the worthless rind of title to property he or she may not use but still must
pay taxes on. This abrogates the rights "to possess, use and dispose of"
property.'-" When the government can do so without paying compensation,
we are perilously close to Ludwig von Mises' definition of fascism: socialism
behind a sham facade of private property. As the Supreme Court noted in
1972:
The dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false
one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to
enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak
or the right to travel, is in truth a 'personal' right. . . . In fact, a
fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty
and the personal right in property. Neither would have meaning without
the other.

152

Justice Joseph Story put the issue starkly when he wrote, "Where the
rights of property have not been held inviolable, there has never been what we
call human rights." To defend human rights, we must ensure that forced
transfers of property-not just through the power of eminent domain, but also
through regulatory takings-be allowed only when just compensation is paid.
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